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conventionally believed must be bulldozed away entirely.

In the thirties the breadwinners of the district worked principally in the stockyards, and during that decade the district and its people became deeply involved in unionizing the packing plants. Building upon the new militancy, and resolving to seize the opportunity it offered for submerging old nationality antagonisms that had previously torn the district asunder, a number of very able men started an experiment in local organization. Called the Back of the Yards Council, the organization adopted the brave slogan, "We, the people, will work out our own destiny."

The council has come to operate much as a government does. It possesses a more inclusive and formal organization than the usual citizens' association, and much greater power, both for carrying out public services of its own and for exerting its will on the municipal government. Policies are set by a kind of legislature of elected representatives from 185 smaller organizations and street neighborhoods. The district's power to get from city hall, the municipal services, facilities, regulations, and exceptions to regulations it needs, is regarded with considerable awe throughout Chicago. In short, the Back of the Yards is no portion of the body politic to take on lightly or unthinkingly in a fight.

In the interval between the formation of the council and the early fifties, the people of the district and their children made other kinds of advancement. Many graduated into skilled industrial, white-collar or professional jobs. The "inevitable" next move at this stage should have been a mass emigration to income-sorting suburbs, with a new wave of people possessing little choice sweeping into the abandoned district.

Like people generally in unslumming city neighborhoods, however, the people of this district wanted to stay. They had already been uncrowding and unslumming within their neighborhoods. The existing institutions, especially the churches, wanted them to stay. At the same time, however, thousands of them also wanted to improve their dwellings beyond the uncrowding and the small amount of refurbishing or refurnishing already accomplished. They were no longer slum dwellers, and they did not wish to live as if they were.

The two desires—to stay and to improve—were incompatible because nobody could get a loan for an improvement. Like the North End, the Back of the Yards was blacklisted for mortgage credit.

But in this case an organization capable of dealing with the problem existed. A survey by the council showed that businesses, residents, and institutions within the district had deposits in some 30 of the neighborhood's savings and loan associations and savings banks. Within the district, it was agreed that these depositors—institutions and businesses as well as individuals—would be prepared to withdraw their deposits if lending institutions continued to blacklist the district.

On July 2, 1953, representatives of the banks and the savings and loan associations turned up by the council's survey were invited to a meeting. The mortgage problem of the district was presented and discussed amiably. Comments were dropped by council spokesmen, politely, about the numbers of depositors in the district, the extent of their deposits, the difficulty of understanding why investment of savings by city dwellers seemed so little available for use in cities, the solid concern about the problem within the district, the value of public understanding.

Before the meeting was over, several of the lenders pledged to consider requests for loans. The same day, the council began negotiating for a site for 49 new dwellings. Soon afterward, the most squalid

row of slum apartments was equipped with indoor plumbing and otherwise modernized, by means of a \$90,000 loan. Within 3 years, some 8,000 houses had been rehabilitated by their owners, and the number rehabilitated since has been so great it has not been kept track of. In 1959, construction of several small apartment houses was begun.

The council, and people within the district, refer to the bank's interest and co-operation in their improvement with gratitude. And the banks, in their turn, speak admiringly of the area as a location for sound investment. Nobody was thrown out of the district and "relocated." No businesses were destroyed. Unslumming, in short, has proceeded, even though the process reached a point—as it eventually does everywhere—when the need for credit became crucial.

#### "FIX THE BUILDINGS, LEAVE THE PEOPLE"

Tragically, too few communities are given the time to develop such stability and power. Again and again, unslumming starts, goes unrecognized, and is destroyed by cataclysmic floods of money for urban renewal or projects. For example, vast blacklisted portions of East Harlem, an unslumming area of immense promise where Puerto Rican immigrants were beginning to emerge as leaders, and hundreds of cultural and social organizations had developed, were destroyed outright—to be replaced by projects which became almost pathological displays of planned slums. Much the same story could be told of Boston's West End, and New York's lower East Side.

There is no way of knowing how many unslumming areas have regressed to slums because of blacklisting, or how many have been destroyed by planners who did not understand what progress was being made. But one thing is certain—most planners are bewildered by the presence of the very people who help make unslumming possible: the citizens who have made some advances and whose earnings no longer conform to slumdwellers' incomes. Such people are characterized as victims of inertia, who need a push. Slum clearance, say the planners, actually does these people a favor by forcing them to better themselves by moving away. (Of course, the comments of those who are unctuously given this information about themselves are unprintable.)

Unless this blindness is cured, unless unslumming—possibly the greatest regenerative force in our cities—is encouraged, our slums will never be overcome. Fortunately, there is evidence that at least some planners are beginning to recognize this need. Stanley Tinkel, a planner for the Regional Plan Association in New York, has called for a reevaluation of present slum-clearance policies which would bring about reforms:

"Why [he has asked] is it just occurring to us to see if slums themselves have some of the ingredients of good housing policy? We are discovering that slum families don't necessarily move when their incomes go up; and (incredible) that slum people, like other people, don't like to be booted out of their neighborhoods."

The next step will require great humility, since we are now so prone to confuse big projects with big social achievements. We will have to admit that it is beyond the scope of anyone's imagination to create a community. We must learn to cherish the communities we have; they are hard to come by. 'Fix the buildings but leave the people.' 'No relocation outside the neighborhood.' These must be the slogans.

Cities themselves are immense laboratories of trial and error, of failure and success in city building, and it is there that planners must learn to form and test their ideas. If they will do this and abandon their superstitions, their old theories and preconceptions, our great cities will flourish as never before.

#### CURRENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, the deep public concern over the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam prompts me to call the attention of my colleagues to the declassification of a response of the Department of Defense to an article written by Robert L. Moore, appearing in the May 18 issue of U.S. News & World Report, which I commended to the House on May 13.

For the past several weeks, the Armed Services Committee has been reviewing the current situation in Vietnam and on May 25, Secretary of Defense McNamara appeared before our committee. During my questioning he stated that responses to the allegations in the Moore article had been prepared. At my request, and the request of the chairman of the committee, he agreed to make these responses available to the members of the committee.

However, it was not until 6 days later and after continual prodding by myself and finally the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that members were furnished with the DOD comments in a document classified "confidential."

In reading over what the Department of Defense had to say about the Moore article, I couldn't see why this classification was required or what, if anything, in the reply was of a confidential nature. I could only conclude that the response of the Department of Defense was so devoid of substance that it had to be classified in order to obscure the true facts from the American people. This I deeply resented and expressed my concern to the chairman of the committee and requested him to obtain a declassified version of the same report. Yesterday I received a letter from the gentleman from Georgia, Chairman VINSON, which I would like to include at this point in the RECORD, advising me that the DOD statement had now been declassified and was no longer "confidential."

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LIBONATI). Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The letter referred to follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, D.C., June 15, 1964.

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAMBERLAIN: There is hereto attached the letter which I have just received from Mr. David E. McGiffert, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, advising me that the confidential comments made by the Department of Defense on statements of Robert L. Moore, in his article, which appeared in the U.S. News & World Report article of May 18, 1964, may be declassified.

Sincerely,

CARL VINSON,  
Chairman.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I ask unanimous consent for the convenience of the Members of the House in reviewing the explanations of the DOD that the

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original article appearing in the May 18 issue of U.S. News & World Report be inserted in the RECORD immediately preceding the statements of the DOD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The article referred to follows:

#### TRUE STORY OF WAR IN VIETNAM

(NOTE.—Go out to the frontlines, in the jungles of South Vietnam, and you get a view of the war that Secretary McNamara and other high Washington officials do not see. One American writer did that, Robert L. Moore, Jr., lived 4 months with United States and Vietnamese soldiers, went on combat missions with them. What this writer saw raises important questions about the way that war is being fought. He found incompetence, cowardice, graft—and no will to win—among many of the Vietnamese officers and public officials directing war operations. In this report, he tells why he thinks the war will not be won until the United States takes over control.)

BARCON, SOUTH VIETNAM.—"In his trips to South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was never exposed to the hard, unpleasant facts facing those Americans who are actually fighting the war against the Communist Vietcong."

These words were written by an American who has spent 4 months living in the field with the United States and Vietnamese fighting forces—actually going with them into combat.

From firsthand experience, this on-the-spot American observer has reached these conclusions:

"The basic problem that America faces in Vietnam is not that of defeating the Vietcong Communists. That could be done in a year or less.

"Our problem is to be allowed to win—to be permitted by our Vietnamese allies to prosecute this war aggressively and end it. This does not necessarily have to involve bringing U.S. battle groups into Vietnam to fight the war. Vietnam has the soldiers and equipment to win.

"But, as U.S. advisers in the field say privately: 'The war can't be won under the present ground rules because of the inability of most Vietnamese military leaders to lead.'"

The American who wrote these conclusions is Robert L. Moore, Jr., from Boston, Mass. He was an Air Force nose gunner in World War II. After graduation from Harvard in 1949, he worked in television and in public relations and then turned to writing. His output includes two books.

Last year Mr. Moore got the consent of the Department of the Army to live among the U.S. Special Forces in South Vietnam to gather material for a book about them. In preparation, he took parachute training at Fort Benning, Ga., went through Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Now, after 4 months in Vietnam, Mr. Moore is returning to write at length about what he has observed there. But he feels that some of his findings are so important and so timely that they should be published quickly. So he has given U.S. News & World Report permission to quote from the first draft of one article that he is preparing.

The story that Mr. Moore tells is a story of a war that Secretary McNamara has not seen. Mr. Moore says:

"Many U.S. fighting men expressed disappointment that the Secretary did not visit American units in daily combat with the Vietcong and find out at firsthand from his soldiers what their problems are.

"The U.S. high command approved of not encourage its men to pass their problems along to the Pentagon Chief."

Following, from Mr. Moore's report, are some of those problems that Americans face in Vietnam.

#### LACKING: A WILL TO WIN

One major problem is the attitude of the Vietnamese. Mr. Moore says:

"The will to fight, endure privations and win is just not in the majority of the Vietnamese military officers."

Mr. Moore questions whether some of the high officials and military officers of that country really want to see the war end. Why? He writes this:

"Never before have so many Vietnamese officers and public officials lived so well in such a booming economy—injected as it is with a daily dose of almost \$2 million of American money.

"It is obvious to the Vietnamese who are benefitting from this dote that when the war is over this massive aid will cease, or at least be drastically modified."

#### ADVISERS IN COMBAT

The official role of U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam is that of advisers to Vietnamese combat forces. But Mr. Moore reports that these so-called advisers have suffered more than half the U.S. combat casualties, although they make up only about 6 percent of the total U.S. force in Vietnam.

Here, from Mr. Moore's account, is how the U.S. Special Forces actually operate:

"The basic Special Forces combat unit—technically referred to as an 'advisory' unit—is a 12-man team known as an A team. There are 42 such units, directed and supported by four B teams, located in the four military-corps areas of South Vietnam, with a headquarters unit known as the Special Forces Operating Base in Saigon.

"Each A team is strategically situated in an area dominated by the Communists. Anywhere from 300 to 600 Vietnamese civilians—trained by the Special Forces—are quartered in an A-team camp and are used to reconnoiter Vietcong positions and raid their concentrations.

"Also in each camp there is a Vietnamese Special Forces A team which, in theory, parallels the American team in capabilities, composition, and organization—that is: two officers and 10 enlisted men."

Actually, however, Mr. Moore finds a great difference between the United States and Vietnamese "Special Forces."

#### OFFICERS PICKED BY POLITICS

Mr. Moore gives this description of the Vietnamese Special Forces—and of how they are selected: "The Vietnamese Special Forces—or Luc-Luong Dac-Biet, to use the Vietnamese designation—were primarily a unit of political troops organized under the regime of the late President, Ngo Dinh Diem, to serve as the President's private police and riot squad.

"Coveted positions in this elite group were given out as political favors to the sons of friends and supporters of President Diem and his family. To give the group status and equip it with the finest U.S. military hardware, Diem allied his Special Forces with U.S. Special Forces—thus saddling the Americans with Vietnamese teams made up of youths who had no taste for combat and whose only training was as palace guards.

"To make things worse, instead of the Vietnamese going out to learn from their highly trained American counterparts, the Vietnamese team captain was made camp commander over the experienced American, who can only advise.

"Despite the two recent coups, each supposedly dedicated to a more aggressive war effort, the character of the Vietnamese Special Forces seems to be changing all too slowly. Vietnamese officers move into and out of the Special Forces camps, but their overall quality still stands at a dismally low level."

#### LUXURY IN MIDST OF WAR

You get this description of how officers of the Vietnamese Special Forces live in the midst of a war:

"Most of the officers have a batman to serve them tea in bed in the mornings. Frequently they refuse to see their American counterpart, particularly if they think he is going to goad them into a combat operation. When they do go out on operations, the officers make their men carry all their equipment. Americans carry their own gear.

"Many 35- or 40-year-old lieutenants and captains—whose lack of political connections accounts for their lack of promotions—are sent to some of the most dangerous areas where the majority of Vietnamese officers refused to be posted.

"With increasing effort by the Vietnamese Government to make the Army more effective, it is usually possible now for a U.S. Special Forces A-team captain to have his Vietnamese counterpart relieved from command. Unfortunately, such officers are merely transferred as camp commander to another Special Forces team in another corps area to begin anew the same cycle of embezzlement of U.S.-supplied funds and deterioration of fighting efficiency."

#### COWARDICE AND LAZINESS

Mr. Moore tells of the difficulties often encountered in trying to get Vietnamese officers to go out and fight the enemy: "I participated in six combat operations throughout the four corps areas and the pattern never deviated. As soon as it was ascertained that a Vietnamese patrol was closing in on a Vietcong concentration, antinoise discipline disintegrated. Shots were accidentally fired and canteens rattled to let the enemy know that he was being pursued.

"When, in spite of these precautions, the Vietcong appeared ready to dig in and fight, the Vietnamese commander inevitably came up with some excuse for pulling back.

"One excuse for turning from the enemy particularly sticks in my mind. It was uttered by a Vietnamese officer in Tay Ninh Province. We had to ford a river to get at what we judged to be a platoon of Vietcong on the other side. We had a full company. The two American advisers were exuberant at the opportunity of engaging a Vietcong unit. But the Vietnamese officer turned to the Americans and said his men could not cross the river because there were too many alligators in it.

"There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule of cowardice and laziness in the Vietnamese Special Forces.

"I spent some time in the camp of a U.S. Special Forces officer who had nothing but praise for his former counterpart, a Vietnamese lieutenant in his early thirties. This Vietnamese officer was an aggressive fighting man, able to inspire great courage and loyalty among the civilian defense troops.

"The American officer wrote a letter of commendation for the Vietnamese officer, recommending that he be given a promotion to captain. Two weeks later the lieutenant was transferred to Saigon and replaced by a more typical Vietnamese officer—a 22-year-old anti-American captain who has failed to go out on a single operation to date.

"U.S. Special Forces men can hardly be blamed for their bitterness toward the Vietnamese officers who make a difficult job almost impossible."

#### GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

Among the things that make American soldiers angry are the graft and corruption that are widespread in Vietnam—even in combat areas. Mr. Moore cites a few examples. Here is one:

"In April I visited several camps where Vietnamese camp commanders had under them 200 or 300 Montagnard troops. Montagnards are mountain tribesmen who are

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the best fighting men in the Vietnamese Army. But the Vietnamese despise the darker skinned and coarser featured Montagnards. These Vietnamese camp commanders made the lives of their Montagnard men so miserable by degrading punishment and cutting down on their food that desertions soared.

"The camp commanders failed to report the deserters until after payday. They collected from the Americans the pay for the entire camp roster, indicating on the payroll that all the deserters had been paid while in actuality the commanders kept the deserters' pay for themselves.

"Yet if Americans object too strenuously to such things they are severely reprimanded for not being cooperative with their Vietnamese counterparts."

Another example:

"On patrols, one Vietnamese commander made his Montagnards hunt deer instead of Vietcong. The commander drove out on the patrols in a weapons carrier. After several days during which he ate heartily while refusing to give the troops any of the meat they provided, the commander drove his load of deer carcasses into town and sold them. This same camp commander had just tried to jail the interpreter who had told the American captain that the commander had pocketed the pay of almost 100 deserters.

"Such stories are so common that Americans begin to take it for granted that they are expected to put up with Vietnamese graft and cowardice as part of their job.

"One U.S. sergeant told me ruefully: 'They took \$1,700 out of my pay for taxes last year, and I have to keep my mouth shut and see it wasted over here.'"

Mr. Moore reports: "There is little confidence among Americans working at the combat level that corruption will be significantly diminished by the announcement of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, the new South Vietnam leader, that he will jail embezzlers of up to \$1,000 and shoot anyone who steals more than that."

## REDAPE AND DELAY

Mr. Moore says: "The biggest single fault in the Vietnamese military system is its chronic inability to react quickly." He cites "a heartbreaking example":

On March 26, two Americans were reported overdue and presumed down on a flight over a jungle area. Vietnamese rangers were asked to join the ground search.

It took 2 days just to get permission—first from a Vietnamese general and then from the district and provincial political chiefs.

Ranger officers then refused to move until they got reserves to stand by in their absence—and a special round of field rations. This cost 3 more days of delay.

On April 1, the rangers finally were flown to a camp from which they were to start a search. Then came word that a new Vietnamese commander was arriving the next day for an inspection—and the rangers had to provide an honor guard.

It was April 3—8 days after the plane went down—when the search finally got underway.

## HOW TO HANDLE SNIPERS: "WITHDRAW"

Here is an example, cited by Mr. Moore, of how Vietnamese can turn U.S. military tactics into tactics of retreat: "If the Secretary of Defense really wants to see at firsthand some of the reasons we cannot win this war in Vietnam without some policy changes, he should spend a week at one of the Special Forces B teams. They are truly microcosms of the entire war. Most of our basic frustrations and quandaries are reflected in a B team's daily incidents.

"At one B team I found the operations officer laughing wryly over the translation of a recent directive. It was about pulling off a few men were routing whole companies and battalions. U.S. advisers showed

the Vietnamese how to dispatch squads to kill or drive off the snipers. The Americans were pleased when a directive on their methods of dealing with snipers went out from corps headquarters.

"A few weeks later, however, the tactical genius of the Vietnamese military mind came forth in a new communique. It instructed units coming under Vietcong sniper fire to withdraw—leaving ambushes in case the sniper charged."

## U.S. EQUIPMENT WASTED

Here is another problem reported by Mr. Moore, from his own observations:

"Secretary McNamara talks about sending more supplies and equipment to help the Vietnamese win their war against communism. This is fine, except that by and large the Vietnamese have no concept of maintenance, much less preventive maintenance. Unless Americans are maintaining the equipment here it quickly deteriorates from sheer lack of care—and then the Vietnamese ask for more."

## RESCUE—OR FLIGHT?

Vietnamese pilots were taught to fly U.S. helicopters, then eight helicopters were turned over to them. The Vietnamese painted parts of the helicopters yellow—the color of their flag. Then the Vietnamese took over the flying of rescue flights to evacuate Vietnamese wounded from jungle combat areas.

Mr. Moore tells how this worked out.

"I had heard so many stories about the Vietnamese pilots' flying over the evacuation site at 5,000 feet, well out of range of ground fire, and then flying back without even trying to pick up the wounded that I decided to go along on an all-Vietnamese evacuation flight.

"For 15 minutes the chopper pilots circled the clearing. Finally the chopper in which I was riding descended almost into the clearing. Then it popped up into the air like a cork released under water. The crew chief examined the fuselage for bullet holes. There were none. So the chopper started to drop in again. Lower and lower we hovered. I saw a wounded man, smiling, being helped toward the helicopter. Then suddenly the helicopter began to rise again. The last thing I saw was a sudden hopeless expression wipe out the game smile on the wounded man's face. Vietcong ground fire had apparently frightened the Vietnamese pilot off, although he later told me he was afraid the clearing was too small and the rotor blades would hit the trees—this after he was already less than a foot from the ground."

"Over and over again," Mr. Moore says, "U.S. advisers reported the terrible fall in morale among the Vietnamese troops when they realized that their own pilots were afraid to come down in Vietcong-infested jungles to pick up the wounded. The ground troops automatically gave up hope when they saw the yellow streak on the choppers high above."

## WHY VILLAGERS DESERT

Vietnamese strategy is to clear an area of Vietcong Communist forces—and then try to hold that area while clearing other areas. But Mr. Moore reports:

"So far, holding operations by the Vietnamese alone have not been successful."

One instance is cited where Americans trained thousands of mountain tribesmen, cleared the area. Then the camp was turned over to the Vietnamese. Result: "Less than 2 months after the Americans pulled out, the Vietcong attacked, drove the Vietnamese out of the fort and destroyed it." Another example:

"In a program to get the Montagnards away from the Vietcong—by training them, feeding the Communists or joining them, either willingly or by impressment—the

tribesmen were taken from their villages in the mountains and brought into new villages built around forts garrisoned by Vietnamese troops. But the Vietnamese troops refuse to leave their forts after dark. So the Vietcong come into the villages at about 6 p.m. and stay the night, giving political orientations, eating, imposing taxes, and punishing villagers suspected of cooperating with the Government. In the morning, the Vietcong leave and the Vietnamese troops take over until evening.

"Until the Vietnamese muster the courage to go out at night and patrol the areas they are supposed to be securing, the entire 'clear and hold' concept is a joke.

"With no protection at night, the villagers know that death and torture will be their lot if they cooperate with the Government. Hundreds of tribesmen are moving back into the hills. As long as they are going to be dominated by the Vietcong anyway, they prefer to be in their own home mountains. And then, of course, they are turned into hardcore Communists when the Vietnamese Air Force bombs and strafes their villages because they deserted their Government hamlets to go back to Vietcong territory."

## SOLUTION: U.S. CONTROL

After watching the war in Vietnam for 4 months, this American writer has reached this overall conclusion:

"Until the Vietnamese military develops the will to win and the courage to face the enemy unflinchingly by day or by night, even if outnumbered, the war against communism in Vietnam will not be won—no matter if we pour in \$3 or \$4 or \$5 million a day in aid.

"The only realistic solution that most Americans see in Vietnam is for the United States to take operational control of the war away from the luxury-loving, coup d'etat-minded, casualty-fearing Vietnamese officer corps until such time as they can develop the leadership necessary to win the war. If we do not take operational control, we merely waste lives and money in a hopeless stalemate."

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Therefore, because of the importance and urgency of the situation in southeast Asia and the corresponding need to have a full and open debate over U.S. policy and performance in that area, I ask unanimous consent that the Defense Department reply to Mr. Robert Moore's statements be inserted in the Record at this point.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The matter referred to follows:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., June 1, 1964.

HON. CARL VINSON,  
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,  
House of Representatives, Washington,  
D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In compliance with your request during the course of the hearing before the committee on May 25, 1964, we are sending you herewith for insertion in the record the comments of the Department of Defense on the statements of Robert L. Moore, Jr., on military operations in Vietnam, as published in the issue of U.S. News & World Report dated May 18, 1964. Additional copies of the comments and of this letter are provided for the members of the committee and the staff.

As you know, Mr. Moore's more than 4 months in Vietnam were spent very largely with U.S. Special Forces groups training and advising Vietnamese Special Forces units. Though intensive, Mr. Moore's experience was nevertheless a limited one, and it is important that his general observations be assessed

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with this limiting factor in mind. Furthermore, Mr. Moore's opinions are not concurred in by our military personnel having a broad background upon which to form sound opinions. The U.S. Special Forces commander in South Vietnam has stated emphatically that the article does not reflect the consensus of U.S. Special Forces personnel in South Vietnam. To the contrary, their consensus reflects increasing respect for their Vietnamese counterparts, particularly during the last 60 to 90 days.

Officers of the regular Vietnamese Army forces, as well as the Vietnamese Special Forces, have fought and are today fighting bravely and successfully against the Vietcong, in close cooperation with their U.S. military advisers. This is the rule, not the exception. The contrary impression created by the U.S. News article is substantially incorrect.

Sincerely,

CHARLES N. GREGG, Jr.,

Special Assistant to the Assistant to the Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS ON MAY 18, 1964, U.S. NEWS ARTICLE QUOTING ROBERT L. MOORE, JR.

Moore article: (1) "But, as U.S. advisers in the field say privately: The war can't be won under the present ground rules because of the inability of most Vietnamese military leaders to lead."

Comments: (1) There has been improvement in the caliber of Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) officers and enlisted men assigned to positions of responsibility since November 1963. Leaders whose incompetence has been evidenced by their actions in the field and in garrison have been replaced by the VNSF high command. Relief of such personnel has often occurred on the recommendation of U.S. Special Forces (USSF) advisers. Positive and aggressive steps are being taken by the present VNSF commander, Col. Lam Son, to further improve the quality and effectiveness of VNSF. Col. Lam Son has introduced to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Special Forces professional Army of Republic of Vietnam leaders of proven ability and reliability. He has established a new VNSF training center near Nha Trang to retrain VNSF key officers and NCO's. The USSF commander in Vietnam has the highest respect for the personal integrity and background of Col. Lam Son as a successful guerrilla leader as well as for his reforms and the tactical proficiency recently instilled in VNSF.

Moore article: (2) "The U.S. high command in Saigon does not encourage its men to pass their problems along to the Pentagon chief."

Comments: (2) Problems which develop at lower echelons are passed up through the normal military chain of command. Those problems which cannot be resolved or for which resources are not available at the level of the U.S. command in Saigon are made known to the Secretary of Defense.

Moore article: (3) "The will to fight, endure privations and win is just not in the majority of the Vietnamese military officers."

Comments: (3) Although there have been instances and examples of an unwillingness to fight aggressively, as indeed there will be in any army, the average Vietnamese officer is courageous and, when properly trained, equipped, and directed, is effective on the field of battle.

Moore article: (4) "Never before have so many Vietnamese officers and public officials lived so well in such a booming economy— injected as it is with a daily dose of almost \$3 million of American money."

"It is obvious to the Vietnamese who are benefiting from this that when the war is over this massive aid will cease, or at least be drastically modified."

Comment: (4) It is well known that the pay and emoluments of the Vietnamese offi-

cials are modest. A first lieutenant in the Vietnamese Army receives 8,406 piasters or approximately \$140 per month. A major general received 17,588 piasters or approximately \$293 per month (ratio: 60 piasters = \$1). It is erroneous to suggest that any responsible citizen or official of the Republic of Vietnam would consider U.S. aid a basis for prolonging this bloody and painful struggle with the Communists.

Moore article: (5) "Advisers" in combat: The official role of U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam is that of advisers to Vietnamese combat forces. But Mr. Moore reports that these so-called advisers have suffered more than half of the U.S. combat casualties, although they make up only about 6 percent of the total U.S. force in Vietnam.

Comment: (5) The number of U.S. military killed in Vietnam in 1963 and 1964 were 110 of whom 17 were Special Forces. The Special Forces personnel represent about 20 percent of the U.S. personnel operative in a combat environment.

Moore article: (6) "Officers picked by politics": Mr. Moore gives this description of the VNSF—and of how they are selected: The VNSF—or Lucluong Dac-Biet, to use the Vietnamese designation—were primarily a unit of political troops organized under the regime of the late President, Ngo Dinh Diem, to serve as the President's private police and riot squad.

"Coveted positions in this elite group were given out as political favors to the sons of friends and supporters of President Diem and his family. To give the group status and equip it with the finest U.S. military hardware, Diem allied his special forces with USSF—thus saddling the Americans with Vietnamese teams made up of youths who had no taste for combat and whose only training was as palace guards."

"To make things worse, instead of the Vietnamese going out to learn from their highly trained American counterparts, the Vietnamese team captain was made camp commander over the experienced American, who can only advise."

"Despite the two recent coups, each supposedly dedicated to a more aggressive war effort, the character of the VNSF seems to be changing too slowly. Vietnamese officers move into and out of jail as power changes hands, but their overall quality still stands at a dismally low level."

Comments: (6) Formerly, elements of the VNSF were used by President Diem as household troops and to some extent for political purposes. Undoubtedly, special considerations entered into his selections and appointment of officers. This practice ended with the change of regime and special forces officers are now selected and assigned on the basis of their qualifications and professional competence. Placing the VNSF officers in command while the U.S. officer acts as adviser is the pattern of the entire U.S. organization and effort in SVN.

Moore article: (7) "Most of the officers (VNSF) have a batman to serve them tea in bed in the mornings. Frequently they refuse to see their American counterpart, particularly if they think he is going to goad them into a combat operation. When they do go out on operations, the officers make their men carry all their equipment. Americans carry their own gear."

"Many 35- or 40-year-old lieutenants and captains—whose lack of political connections accounts for their lack of promotions—are sent to some of the most dangerous areas where the majority of Vietnamese officers refused to be posted."

"With increasing effort by the Vietnamese Government to make the Army more effective, it is equally possible that VNSF A-team captain to have his Vietnamese counterpart relieved from command. Unfortunately, such officers are merely transferred as camp commander to another Spe-

cial Forces team in another corps area to begin anew the same cycle of embezzlement of U.S. supplied funds and deterioration of fighting efficiency."

Comments: (7) By no stretch of imagination can the environment of remote guerrilla-type camp of VNSF be considered a luxury though a few officers may have adopted the British and French custom of being awakened with a cup of hot tea. It is an exaggeration to say that most of the officers do this.

The exceptional incidents where the VNSF officer has refused to see an American USSF adviser have invariably resulted in relief of the incompetent by the new VNSF commander—Col. Lam Son. There is no evidence that 40-year-old lieutenants and captains are deliberately assigned to more dangerous areas. It is true that on one occasion, a VNSF lieutenant was relieved from duty and transferred to another camp and given a second chance. He has since been relieved a second time.

With respect to embezzling, there is only one known case where a VNSF officer obtained funds illegally and deserted. On the contrary, USSF "A" detachment commanders witness all troop payments and retain vouchers recording each payment made. The statement about another cycle of embezzlement at another camp is without foundation.

Moore article: (8) "Cowardice and laziness": "I participated in six combat operations throughout the four corps areas and the pattern never deviated. As soon as it was ascertained that a Vietnamese patrol was closing in on a Viet Cong concentration, anti-noise discipline disintegrated. Shots were accidentally fired and canteens rattled to let the enemy know that he was being pursued."

Comments: (8) Moore no doubt observed some poorly conducted combat operations, as many paramilitary operations are on-the-job training courses for newly recruited personnel. However, it can also be said in contradiction that these same personnel have engaged in some highly successful engagements as they gained experience and training. VNSF have killed an average of six VC to each friendly fatality over the past year. There is no basis for the generalization that VN commanders inevitably "want to pull back." Many instances of bold conduct and aggressive leadership can be cited; and splendid VNSF leaders have given their lives in combat.

Moore article: (9) "USSF men can hardly be blamed for their bitterness toward the Vietnamese officers who make a difficult job almost impossible."

Comments: (9) Isolated instances do not constitute a pattern. USSF are highly trained and motivated to cope with all the difficulties inherent in guerrilla warfare including occasional frustrations.

Moore article: (10) "Graft and corruption. Among the things that make American soldiers angry are the graft and corruption that are widespread in Vietnam—even in combat areas. Mr. Moore cites a few examples. Here is one:

"In April I visited several camps where Vietnamese camp commanders had under them 200 or 300 Montagnard troops. Montagnards are mountain tribesmen who are the best fighting men in the Vietnamese Army. But the Vietnamese despise the darker skinned, and coarser featured Montagnards. These Vietnamese camp commanders made the lives of their Montagnard men so miserable by degrading punishment and cutting down on their food that desertions soared."

"The camp commanders failed to report the deserters until after payday. They collected from the Americans the pay for the entire camp roster, including on the payroll that all the deserters had been paid while in actuality the commanders kept the deserters' pay for themselves."